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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 We granted certiorari in this case to decide three 
questions: (1) whether the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
correctly applied independent appellate review for actual-
malice determinations in public-figure libel suits, (2) 
what the appropriate actual-malice standard is in 
defamation-by-implication cases, and (3) whether the 
justices should have recused themselves. We conclude 
that although the Supreme Court misapplied independent 
appellate review, it correctly held that Leon Kendall—a 
judge formerly on the Virgin Islands Superior Court—
cannot establish actual malice for his libel claim. This 
conclusion means that we need not decide the recusal 
question because our plenary review makes any potential 
error from the alleged bias harmless. Accordingly, we 
will affirm the Court’s judgment. 
I 
A. Factual History 
Judge Kendall contends that the Daily News and 
Joy Blackburn (“the defendants” or “Daily News”) 
defamed him while reporting on three events in his 
judicial career: his decision to grant bail to Daniel 
Castillo, his decision to place Ashley Williams under 
house arrest, and his decision to retire. Most of the Daily 
News’s articles admitted into evidence discussed the bail 
decision. Castillo appeared before Judge Kendall in 
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March of 2007 for a preliminary hearing for a charge of 
aggravated assault. The Government requested that bail 
be set at $500 because he had previous encounters with 
the criminal justice system: a 2003 felony conviction for 
possession of stolen property and a 2004 rape charge that 
(according to the Government) had been dismissed. 
Castillo’s criminal record contained the 2003 conviction 
but stated that the rape charge had “no known 
disp[osition].” In actuality, the rape charge had been one 
of nine charges which were dismissed when Castillo 
entered a plea agreement for assault with a deadly 
weapon. These charges and the assault conviction were 
absent from the criminal record presented to Judge 
Kendall. Thus, nothing presented at the hearing indicated 
that Castillo had a history of violence. 
Judge Kendall released Castillo on his own 
recognizance. On April 6, 2007, Castillo murdered a 
twelve-year-old girl. Coverage of the murder in the April 
14, 2007 edition of the Daily News explained that 
Castillo was free on his own recognizance on the 
aggravated assault charges when he committed the 
murder. After recounting the alleged facts of the assault, 
the Daily News described the preliminary hearing: 
“Kendall found probable cause to charge Castillo [with 
assault] but released him pending trial—despite 
Castillo’s history of violence including charges of rape, 
assault and weapons violations.” Judge Kendall contends 
this statement and similar statements in subsequent 
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articles were defamatory because they implied that he 
was aware of Castillo’s violent history when, in fact, he 
was not. 
The second set of articles at issue covers Judge 
Kendall’s decision to place Ashley Williams under house 
arrest. On November 17, 2006, a jury convicted Williams 
of first-degree rape, first-degree assault, and first-degree 
unlawful sexual contact. After receiving the verdict, the 
Government sought to have Williams remanded into 
custody. Williams, however, requested that he be free 
over the weekend to get his affairs in order before 
reporting to prison. Judge Kendall granted Williams’s 
request but placed him under house arrest. 
Williams failed to report to jail the following 
Monday as required by Judge Kendall’s order. Instead, 
Williams refused to leave his home and threatened to 
blow himself up during a five-hour standoff with police. 
In a November 21, 2006 article, the Daily News reported 
on the standoff and explained that Williams was at his 
home because after he was “convicted of rape and 
assault,” he was “allowed by a judge to spend the 
weekend in the community unsupervised before he was 
supposed to report to jail Monday.” The article further 
explained that Judge Kendall had released Williams and 
that “[t]ypically, people convicted of violent crimes . . . 
are remanded into custody to await sentencing once they 
are found guilty.” Judge Kendall contends that the Daily 
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News defamed him by stating that Williams was 
“unsupervised” in the community when, in fact, Williams 
was under house arrest at the time of the standoff with 
police. 
The final event at issue was Judge Kendall’s 
decision to retire. In a February 19, 2009 article, the 
Daily News reported on that decision in an article 
subtitled “[t]hree judicial complaints against him still 
pending.” This subtitle referred to three complaints filed 
against Judge Kendall with the Virgin Islands 
Commission on Judicial Disabilities for allegedly 
misapplying the law in his bail decisions. At the time the 
article was published, Judge Kendall had successfully 
challenged the authority of the Commission to hold 
hearings regarding the complaints in the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands. This ruling, however, was still on 
appeal to this Court. Judge Kendall argues that the Daily 
News defamed him by stating that the complaints were 
“still pending,” even though they had been dismissed by 
the District Court. 
B. Procedural History 
 On October 5, 2007, Judge Kendall filed this libel 
action against the Daily News and two of its reporters, 
Joy Blackburn and Joseph Tsidulko, in the Virgin Islands 
Superior Court. After Judge Kendall amended his 
original complaint to include the retirement article and 
the parties completed discovery, the case proceeded to a 
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jury trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Judge 
Kendall for $240,000, and against the Daily News and 
Blackburn. The jury determined that Tsidulko was not 
liable. The Daily News and Blackburn subsequently 
moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The 
Superior Court granted this motion and entered a directed 
verdict in their favor. 
 Judge Kendall appealed the Superior Court’s 
judgment to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court. Judge 
Kendall requested that the justices recuse themselves 
because they had initiated a criminal contempt charge 
pending against him.1
(1) whether the ‘actual malice’ standard 
articulated in New York Times v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964), can be 
satisfied by a defendant’s mere awareness of 
a defamatory implication (as opposed to an 
 The Supreme Court denied his 
request and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment on 
the narrow ground that Judge Kendall could not prove 
actual malice for any of the statements. We subsequently 
granted certiorari to answer three questions:  
                                                 
1 The criminal contempt charge against Judge Kendall is 
the subject of a separate proceeding before this panel that 
is still pending and was argued on December 6, 2012. See 
In re Kendall, No. 11-4471 (3d Cir. argued Dec. 6, 
2012). 
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actual intent to convey that implication) and, 
if so, whether the standard was satisfied in 
this case;  
(2) whether the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court’s review exceeded the scope of the 
“independent examination” required by Bose 
Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 
U.S. 485, 499 (1984); and  
(3) whether the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court Justices erred in not recusing 
themselves from this matter. 
 We exercise plenary review over decisions of the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court that relate to questions of 
federal constitutional law. See People of the V.I. v. John, 
654 F.3d 412, 415, 417–22 (3d Cir. 2011); Pichardo v. 
V.I. Comm’r of Labor, 613 F.3d 87, 98 (3d Cir. 2010). 
II 
Before turning to the merits, we must first examine 
whether Congress has removed our jurisdiction over this 
case with recent legislation that changes how decisions of 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court are reviewed by 
federal courts. See In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 288 
F.3d 83, 88 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that “we have an 
‘independent responsibility to examine our own 
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jurisdiction sua sponte’” (quoting In re Ford Motor Co., 
110 F.3d 954, 958–59 (3d Cir. 1997))).  
 In the Revised Organic Act of 1954, as amended in 
1984, Congress authorized the Virgin Islands legislature 
to establish its own local appellate court and provided 
that when it did so, we would exercise certiorari 
jurisdiction over that court’s final decisions for a limited 
period of institutional development. See Defoe v. Phillip, 
702 F.3d 735, 738–40 (3d Cir. 2012) (laying out the 
history of our relationship with the courts of the Virgin 
Islands). Our certiorari jurisdiction was to last up to 
fifteen years from the creation of the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court—enough time for the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court to develop “sufficient institutional 
traditions [of its own] to justify direct review by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.” 48 U.S.C. § 1613. 
Recognizing that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court might 
develop sufficient institutional traditions before the 
fifteen-year mark, however, Congress required this Court 
to regularly evaluate and report on its progress. Id.; see 
also Defoe, 702 F.3d at 739–40. The Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court passed that test with flying colors last 
year when a committee of this Court recommended to the 
Third Circuit Judicial Council that Congress eliminate 
our certiorari jurisdiction over Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court decisions in favor of direct review by the United 
States Supreme Court. See Judicial Council of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Report on the 
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Virgin Islands Supreme Court 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.visupremecourt.org/wfData/files/ 
BookletReportofVirginIslandsSupremeCourt.pdf. 
Congress agreed and quickly acted on the Third 
Circuit’s recommendation. By December 13, 2012, both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate had passed 
H.R. 6116, a bill that would eliminate our certiorari 
jurisdiction over final decisions of the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court and replace it with direct review by the 
Supreme Court of the United States. See An Act to 
amend the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands to 
provide for direct review by the United States Supreme 
Court of decisions of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, 
H.R. 6116, §§ 1–2, 112th Cong. (2012). President Obama 
signed H.R. 6116 into law on December 28, 2012. 
We must now decide whether H.R. 6116 strips us 
of our certiorari jurisdiction over cases like this one in 
which certiorari has been granted and the matter is 
awaiting decision at the time of the bill’s enactment. We 
hold that it does not.   
When interpreting a statute, we normally presume 
that the statute does not apply retroactively—that is, to 
cases pending on the date of the law’s enactment—absent 
clear congressional intent to the contrary. Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576 (2006) (citing Landgraf v. 
USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994)). This 
presumption against retroactivity, however, does not 
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apply to statutes that only alter jurisdiction. “[U]nlike 
other intervening changes in the law, a jurisdiction-
conferring or jurisdiction-stripping statute usually ‘takes 
away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal 
that is to hear the case.’” Id. at 576–77 (quoting 
Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508 (1916)). 
Consequently, as the Supreme Court has explained, “no 
retroactivity problem arises” with respect to an 
intervening change in jurisdiction “because the change in 
the law does not ‘impair rights a party possessed when he 
acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or 
impose new duties with respect to transactions already 
completed.’” Id. at 577 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 
280).  
 “That does not mean, however, that all 
jurisdiction-stripping provisions . . . must apply to cases 
pending at the time of their enactment.” Id. After all, 
“‘[n]ormal rules of [statutory] construction’ . . . may 
dictate otherwise.” Id. (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 
U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). Here, Congress spoke clearly: 
“[t]he amendments made by [H.R. 6116]”—that is, the 
elimination of the Third Circuit’s certiorari jurisdiction 
and substitution of such review by the United States 
Supreme Court—“apply to cases commenced on or after 
the date of the enactment of [H.R. 6116].” H.R. 6116 § 3. 
No matter whether “cases commenced” carries a broader 
meaning referring to the filing of a complaint in the 
Superior Court or a narrower meaning referring to the 
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filing of a certiorari petition in this Court—an issue we 
need not decide today—Kendall commenced this case 
long before H.R. 6116’s enactment.   
 We are mindful that the Ninth Circuit reached the 
opposite conclusion about Congress’s elimination of its 
certiorari jurisdiction over the Guam Supreme Court’s 
decisions. See Santos v. Guam, 436 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th 
Cir. 2006). There, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
Congress’s elimination of its certiorari jurisdiction (and 
substitution of direct review by the Supreme Court of the 
United States) did apply to pending cases. 
But Santos is distinguishable for at least two 
reasons. To the extent that Santos interprets Supreme 
Court precedent as holding that jurisdiction-stripping 
provisions automatically apply retroactively absent an 
express reservation of jurisdiction over pending cases, 
the Supreme Court subsequently rejected such an 
approach in Hamdan. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 584 
(rejecting this “inflexible” rule advanced by Justice 
Scalia’s dissent and by the Government). More 
importantly, the jurisdiction-stripping provision in Santos 
differs markedly from the one we confront here. In 
Santos, the Ninth Circuit addressed a statute in which 
Congress was completely silent about the effective date 
of the jurisdiction-stripping provision. Santos, 436 F.3d 
at 1053 (explaining that Congress did not “express[] an 
intent as to the effective date”). By contrast, Congress 
13 
 
was explicit that H.R. 6116’s amendments apply only “to 
cases commenced on or after the date of the enactment” 
of the statute. See H.R. 6116 § 3. As a result, we retain 
certiorari jurisdiction over all cases “commenced” before 
the President signed H.R. 6116, including this one. See 
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 584 (drawing the negative inference 
that Congress did not intend to eliminate jurisdiction over 
pending detainee habeas petitions where the statute was 
silent about whether its jurisdiction-stripping subsection 
applied to cases even though it expressly made two other 
subsections retroactive). 
III 
A. Independent Appellate Review 
The parties disagree whether the Virgin Island 
Supreme Court correctly applied the independent-
appellate-review standard applied to determinations of 
actual malice. See Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 509–11. 
Independent appellate review is a two-step process. The 
reviewing court first determines what credibility 
determinations the jury must have made. This is done by 
discarding the evidence or testimony that the “jury must 
have rejected” on the basis of “the trial court’s 
instructions, the jury’s answers to . . . special 
interrogatories, and an understanding of those facts not in 
dispute.” Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 
491 U.S. 657, 690 (1989). These “credibility 
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determinations are reviewed under the clearly-erroneous 
standard.” Id. at 688.  
The evidence which is not excluded by the Harte-
Hanks test is then weighed “alongside the undisputed 
evidence” to determine if the defendant acted with actual 
malice. Id. at 690–91. In other words, as the Ninth 
Circuit explained in Eastwood v. National Enquirer, Inc., 
123 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1997), “we must figure out, as 
best we can from the cold record, which evidence the 
jury accepted as credible, and which it discarded. Then 
we must determine whether the believed evidence 
establishes actual malice.” Id. at 1252. 
The Virgin Islands Supreme Court did not apply 
this standard in its review. At no point did the Supreme 
Court analyze what credibility determinations the jury 
must have made, nor did it express the need to defer to 
the credibility determinations of the jury. As seen in the 
two-step process described, however, “[i]ndependent 
review is not a limitless ransacking of the record as a 
whole. . . . Purely factual determinations (such as 
credibility calls) remain subject to the usual degree of 
deference.” Mandel v. Boston Phoenix, Inc., 456 F.3d 
198, 208 (1st Cir. 2006). The Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court thus erred by not determining whether the jury 
made any credibility determinations to which it had to 
accord deference. 
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B. Actual Malice 
 The Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s 
misapplication of independent appellate review is 
reversible error only if we were to reach a different result 
by applying the standard appropriately. See Harte-Hanks, 
491 U.S. at 689–93 (affirming a circuit court holding 
even though that court had misapplied the independent-
appellate-review standard). The Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court concluded that the evidence was insufficiently 
clear and convincing to support a jury finding of actual 
malice. Before we can decide whether that conclusion is 
correct, we must resolve a dispute between the parties 
regarding what constitutes actual malice in defamation-
by-implication cases.2
In defamation-by-implication cases, the alleged 
  
                                                 
2 The Daily News contends that Judge Kendall has 
waived this argument because he did not argue that the 
Superior Court applied the wrong standard before the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court. We disagree because the 
Superior Court used the actual-malice standard urged by 
Judge Kendall. The possibility that actual malice requires 
something different in defamation-by-implication cases 
was first recognized and used by the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court, which means Judge Kendall is free to 
argue that this is a new error perpetrated by the Supreme 
Court. 
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defamatory statement has two possible meanings, one 
that is defamatory and one that is not. See 50 Am. Jur. 2d 
Libel and Slander § 158 (explaining that “‘[d]efamation 
by implication’ occurs when a defendant juxtaposes a 
series of facts to imply a defamatory connection between 
them”). These cases differ from ordinary defamation 
cases in which the alleged defamatory statement has only 
a defamatory meaning. See id. § 118 (collecting manners 
in which a statement can be defamatory); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (explaining that “[a] 
communication is defamatory if it tends to so harm the 
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of 
the community or to deter third persons from associating 
or dealing with him”) (1977). In ordinary defamation 
cases, the actual-malice standard is relatively clear and 
undisputed by the parties. “The Supreme Court has 
defined actual malice as knowledge that a statement was 
false or [made with] reckless disregard of whether it was 
false or not.” Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 
F.2d 1069, 1089 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Sullivan, 376 
U.S. at 280) (quotation marks omitted). Recklessness is 
shown by demonstrating that “the defendant in fact 
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement 
or that the defendant had a subjective awareness of 
probable falsity.” Id. (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted). “[This] standard is a subjective one, 
based on the defendant’s actual state of mind . . . .” Id. 
(citing St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 
(1968)). 
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The parties disagree, however, on what constitutes 
actual malice in defamation-by-implication cases. They 
agree that there are two elements to actual malice in these 
cases: a “falsity” element and a “communicative intent” 
element. The parties also agree as to what satisfies the 
falsity element—that is, the extent to which defendants 
must be aware that the defamatory meaning of their 
statement is false. For this element, the parties concur 
that plaintiffs must show that the defendants either knew 
that the defamatory meaning of their statement was false 
or were reckless in regard to the defamatory meaning’s 
falsity.  
They disagree, however, over what is sufficient to 
satisfy the communicative-intent element—that is, the 
extent to which defendants must be aware of the 
defamatory meaning of their statement. The Daily News 
argues that plaintiffs can satisfy this element only by 
showing that the defendants intended the defamatory 
meaning. Judge Kendall agrees that intentional 
communication of the defamatory meaning is sufficient 
but argues that plaintiffs can also satisfy this element by 
showing that the defendants were aware of the 
defamatory meaning and acted recklessly in regard to it.  
Resolving this disagreement requires us to answer 
two questions: (1) Does the actual-malice standard apply 
differently in defamation-by-implication cases than in 
ordinary defamation cases such that more than 
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knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth is 
required (as the parties believe)? (2) If the standard is 
different, then is actual malice established, on one hand, 
only by showing that the defendant intended to 
communicate the defamatory meaning or, on the other 
hand, by showing either that the defendant intended to 
communicate the defamatory meaning or was aware of 
the defamatory meaning and reckless in regard to it? 
We agree with the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits: plaintiffs in defamation-by-implication cases 
must show something beyond knowledge of, or 
recklessness in regard to, the falsity of the statement’s 
defamatory meaning. Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s 
Investors Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 528–29 (6th Cir. 
2007); Howard v. Antilla, 294 F.3d 244, 252 (1st Cir. 
2002); Newton v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 930 F.2d 662, 
681 (9th Cir. 1990); Saenz v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 841 
F.2d 1309, 1317–18 (7th Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court 
has explained that in the libel context, “[m]alice [has 
been] defined in numerous ways, but in general 
depend[s] upon a showing that the defendant acted with 
improper motive.” Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 163–
64 (1979). Showing motive “hinge[s] upon the intent or 
purpose with which the publication was made.” Id. 
at 164. These statements show that the intent of the 
publisher is linked to determining if that publisher had 
the actual malice necessary to support a libel claim. Cf. 
Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688 (explaining that actual 
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malice involves a subjective inquiry into a defendant’s 
mental state rather than just an objective determination of 
a statement’s truth); Saenz, 841 F.2d at 1317 (“Proof of 
actual malice depends upon the defendant’s actual state 
of mind.” (citing Herbert, 441 U.S. at 160)). 
The need to show intent necessarily means that the 
actual-malice standard will have different elements of 
proof in ordinary defamation cases than in defamation-
by-implication cases. In ordinary defamation cases, intent 
to defame can be established solely through knowledge 
that the statement was false. After all, if the defendants 
knew that the statement made was false and defamatory, 
then they must have intended to defame. And while the 
statement itself rarely indicates whether its publisher 
knew it was false, the statement does show that its 
publisher knew it was defamatory because it can have 
only defamatory meanings. So all a plaintiff needs to 
demonstrate in ordinary defamation cases to establish 
intent to defame is that the defendants knew their 
statement was false.  
But in defamation-by-implication cases, showing 
known falsity alone is inadequate to establish an intent to 
defame. In these cases, we may no longer presume with 
certainty that the defendants knew they were making a 
defamatory statement because the statement has 
defamatory and nondefamatory meanings. Therefore, in 
such cases, plaintiffs must show something that 
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establishes defendants’ intent to communicate the 
defamatory meaning. 
This second element of actual malice—showing 
the defendant’s communicative intent—can be satisfied, 
as Judge Kendall argues, by demonstrating that the 
defendant either intended to communicate the defamatory 
meaning or knew of the defamatory meaning and was 
reckless in regard to it. This approach necessarily follows 
from the Supreme Court’s inclusion of recklessness in 
the actual-malice standard. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280. 
Actual malice is a term of art that the Court has explained 
“should not be confused with the concept of malice as an 
evil intent or a motive arising from spite or ill will”; it 
should be understood to be “a shorthand [used] to 
describe the First Amendment protections for speech 
injurious to reputation.” Masson v. New Yorker 
Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510–11 (1991). 
Recklessness has always been included in the definition 
of actual malice under the First Amendment. See, e.g., 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280 (defining actual malice as 
speaking “with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”); 
Masson, 501 U.S. at 510 (restating Sullivan’s definition 
of actual malice). The Court has even described reckless 
disregard as “the line which our cases have drawn 
between false communications which are protected and 
those which are not” that represents the appropriate 
balancing of the interests at stake in First Amendment 
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cases. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731–32. Recklessness is 
thus the outer limit of actual malice, which means that 
the communicative-intent element of actual malice in 
defamation-by-implication cases can be satisfied by 
reckless disregard for the defamatory meaning of a 
statement. 
This approach is supported by the First, Sixth, and 
Seventh Circuits. These courts have stated that to find 
actual malice in defamation-by-implication cases, the 
plaintiff must “show with clear and convincing evidence 
that the defendants intended or knew of the implications 
that the plaintiff is attempting to draw from the allegedly 
defamatory material.” Saenz, 841 F.2d at 1317–18; see 
Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 528–29; Howard, 
294 F.3d at 252. This formulation of the rule was first 
stated by the Seventh Circuit in Saenz, which the First 
and Sixth Circuits subsequently quoted without 
elaboration. See Howard, 294 F.3d at 252; Compuware 
Corp., 499 F.3d at 528–29. Admittedly, this statement of 
the actual-malice standard uses the phrase “knew of the 
implications” rather than “recklessness.” The Saenz 
Court, however, treated the phrase “knew of” and the 
word “recklessness” as synonymous, which is evident in 
its rearticulation of the standard as requiring the plaintiff 
to establish “that the defendants intended to imply or 
were reckless toward the [defamatory] implications.” 
Saenz, 841 F.2d at 1318. The actual-malice standard we 
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adopt is thus the same as that articulated by the Seventh 
Circuit and later adopted by the First and Sixth Circuits. 
We emphasize the recklessness conception of this 
test rather than the “know of” conception because 
recklessness conforms more closely with the Supreme 
Court’s definition of actual malice. Furthermore, mere 
knowledge of the defamatory meaning of a statement that 
also has a nondefamatory meaning cannot be enough. 
The Supreme Court’s balancing of the First Amendment 
interests in public-affairs libel suits favors permitting 
some libelous conduct to avoid chilling protected speech. 
See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731–32 (explaining that the 
recklessness standard is preferable to a reasonable-man 
standard because “protect[ing] some erroneous 
publications as well as true ones” is necessary “to insure 
the ascertainment and publication of the truth about 
public affairs”). Yet if mere knowledge were sufficient to 
find defamatory intent, then actual malice could be found 
no matter how unlikely it is that a listener would interpret 
the statement as having the defamatory meaning. This is 
contrary to the Supreme Court’s preference for a broader 
scope of protection for potentially libelous speech. 
Recklessness, by contrast, captures this preference 
because it requires that the defendants knew that the 
defamatory meaning was not just possible, but likely, and 
still made the statement despite their knowledge of that 
likelihood. Cf. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688 (defining 
reckless disregard for the truth as instances where “the 
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defendant actually had a high degree of awareness of 
probable falsity”). 
The defendants rely on the Ninth Circuit’s Newton 
decision,3
                                                 
3 The defendants cite several additional cases to support 
their argument. These decisions, however, do not discuss 
the actual-malice standard. Instead, they analyze what 
needs to be shown to satisfy the state-law elements of 
libel in defamation-by-implication cases. See Nichols v. 
Moore, 477 F.3d 396, 402 (6th Cir. 2007); Chapin v. 
Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1092–93 (4th Cir. 
1993); White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 
518–19 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 which does not include reckless disregard for, 
or knowledge of, the defamatory meaning in its 
articulation of the communicative-intent element. 
930 F.2d at 681 (explaining that libel liability cannot be 
permitted for “what was not intended to be said”). The 
Newton Court did not consider, much less reject, whether 
the communicative-intent element may be satisfied by 
showing a reckless disregard for the defamatory meaning 
of a statement. See 930 F.2d at 681. The decision thus 
does not necessarily conflict with the standard we now 
adopt. See Howard, 294 F.3d at 254 (treating the Ninth 
Circuit’s Newton decision as compatible with the Seventh 
Circuit’s Saenz decision). Moreover, to the extent the 
Ninth Circuit’s usage provides any persuasive value to 
the defendants’ argument, that value is outweighed by the 
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inclusion of recklessness in the Supreme Court’s 
definition of actual malice. 
IV 
 We next consider whether the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court erred by ruling that Judge Kendall cannot 
establish actual malice. We will reverse the Supreme 
Court only if our independent review of the record shows 
that a jury could find actual malice by clear-and-
convincing evidence. Tucker v. Fischbein, 237 F.3d 275, 
284 (3d Cir. 2001). This standard “requires the [plaintiff] 
to provide evidence so clear, direct, weighty, and 
convincing as to enable a clear conviction, without 
hesitation, about whether or not the defendants acted” in 
a way that renders them liable. See Amica Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Fogel, 656 F.3d 167, 179 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Kendall 
contends that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court erred by 
holding that the evidence is insufficient to find actual 
malice for statements made in the articles relating to his 
release of Castillo on his own recognizance, his decision 
to place Williams under house arrest, and his decision to 
retire. We agree with the Supreme Court’s ruling in its 
entirety and will thus affirm. 
A. Castillo Articles 
 Judge Kendall argues that the defendants’ articles 
relating to his bail decision in Daniel Castillo’s case are 
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defamatory because they implied that he knew of 
Castillo’s history of violence when he released Castillo 
on his own recognizance. The defendants’ articles 
contained the statement (or statements similar to): 
“Kendall found probable cause to charge Castillo but 
released him pending trial—despite Castillo’s history of 
violence including charges of rape, assault and weapons 
violations.” Although this statement does not explicitly 
say that Judge Kendall released Castillo despite knowing 
of his history of violence, Judge Kendall contends that 
this is the implication the defendants intended readers to 
understand. As we have explained, to show actual malice 
for defamation by implication, Judge Kendall must show 
by clear-and-convincing evidence both (1) that the 
defendants either intended the defamatory meaning or 
knew of the defamatory meaning and were reckless in 
regard to it, and (2) that the defendants made the 
statement with “knowledge that [the] statement was false 
or [with] reckless disregard of whether it was false or 
not,” Schiavone Constr. Co., 847 F.2d at 1089 (quoting 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280) (quotation marks omitted). 
 Judge Kendall first argues that we must disregard 
the testimony of Blackburn, who authored the articles, 
because the jury must have found her testimony 
incredible. See Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 690. We agree. 
Blackburn testified that when she wrote the statement, 
she intended a nondefamatory meaning that “Mr. Castillo 
had a history of violence and Judge Kendall did choose 
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to release him.” The jury must have concluded that this 
testimony was incredible because to decide otherwise—
that Blackburn did not intend the defamatory meaning—
would have prevented them from finding actual malice, 
as they did. We thus cannot consider Blackburn’s 
testimony about the meaning of her statement.  
The jury’s rejection of her testimony does not end 
our analysis, however. Mere disbelief of a defendant’s 
statement ordinarily is insufficient to establish malice. 
Bose, 466 U.S. at 512 (“When the testimony of a witness 
is not believed, the trier of fact may simply disregard it. 
Normally the discredited testimony is not considered a 
sufficient basis for drawing a contrary conclusion.”). 
Judge Kendall argues that the communicative-intent 
element of actual malice is satisfied through Blackburn’s 
coverage of protests that followed Castillo’s murder of a 
12-year-old girl. Judge Kendall contends that even if the 
defendants were initially unaware that their statement 
could imply that he was aware of Castillo’s history of 
violence when he released him on his own recognizance, 
they were made aware through the protests organized by 
people who, as Blackburn acknowledged at trial, 
“understood that Judge Kendall had released Mr. Castillo 
despite his history of violence.” Once the defendants 
were aware of what the public understood their statement 
to mean, he argues, their continued publication of the 
statement was at least reckless.  
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This evidence is insufficient to satisfy the 
communicative-intent element by clear-and-convincing 
evidence in light of the subjective nature of the actual-
malice inquiry. Schiavone Constr. Co., 847 F.2d at 1089 
(quoting St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731). The subjective 
nature of this inquiry requires that there be some 
evidence showing, directly or circumstantially, that the 
defendants themselves understood the potential 
defamatory meaning of their statement. Id. (quoting St. 
Amant, 390 U.S. at 731). No direct evidence in the record 
of this case suggests that the defendants themselves knew 
of, much less intended, the defamatory meaning.  
There is also no circumstantial evidence of record 
linking the protestors’ understanding of what took place 
with the statement made by the defendants. The 
protestors’ testimony did not establish that the Daily 
News was their source. The protesters could not recall at 
trial whether their source was the statements by the Daily 
News or coverage from other Virgin Islands news outlets. 
If the Daily News’s reporting had been the sole source of 
information for Castillo’s case, then Judge Kendall 
would have a stronger basis for inferring the defendants’ 
knowledge of and recklessness with regard to the 
defamatory meaning of the statement. But here, the story 
was covered by several news outlets, which makes it 
impossible to know whether the protests were caused or 
informed by the defendants’ statements. Consequently, 
we cannot conclude with “clear conviction” and “without 
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hesitation” that the defendants were made aware of the 
defamatory meaning of their statement through their 
coverage of the protests. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 
at 179 (explaining what satisfies the clear-and-
convincing standard). Because Judge Kendall cannot 
establish that the defendants intended the defamatory 
meaning or knew of it and were reckless in regard to it, 
he fails to prove actual malice by clear-and-convincing 
evidence.4
 Judge Kendall next argues that the Daily News’s 
articles regarding Ashley Williams are defamatory 
because they stated that Judge Kendall allowed Williams 
“to spend the weekend in the community unsupervised.” 
In fact, Judge Kendall had placed him under house arrest. 
This is an ordinary defamatory statement rather than one 
by implication, so to establish actual malice, Judge 
Kendall must show that the statement was made with 
“knowledge that [the] statement was false or [with] 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” 
 
B. Williams Articles 
                                                 
4 Because Judge Kendall needs to show both elements of 
actual malice to succeed, and we conclude that he cannot 
satisfy the communicative-intent elements, we need not 
address whether he can prove that the defendants knew of 
or recklessly disregarded the Castillo articles’ falsity. 
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Schiavone Constr. Co., 847 F.2d at 1089 (quoting 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280) (quotation marks omitted). 
 There is no evidence that the defendants knew 
their statement was false. Blackburn, who authored this 
article, was not informed that the statement was incorrect 
until litigation commenced. Judge Kendall argues, 
however, that Blackburn’s testimony demonstrates actual 
malice through recklessness. He contends that the jury 
must have determined from her testimony that she 
fabricated her “unsupervised” description because she 
did not have a source for the assertion. Fabrication may 
constitute recklessness, St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732, but 
the jury did not necessarily conclude that she was without 
a source for her article. The relevant testimony is: 
Q: You didn’t tell [the public] that 
[Williams] had been placed under house 
arrest with arrangements to be made by the 
Marshals, right? 
A: No one there that night, none of those 
officers who were there, not a single one of 
them were saying, oh, Mr. Williams is under 
house arrest. 
Q: Did you ask that question? 
A: No, sir. 
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. . . 
Q: Miss Blackburn, did you walk over to 
any of those people, those law enforcement 
people, and say, could you tell me what’s 
going on here? What are the circumstances 
of Mr. Williams being in his home? 
You had already written your story two days 
earlier. You knew he had been convicted. 
A: Yeah, I knew he had been convicted. And 
– 
Q: So, didn’t you think it was important, 
before you told the community that Judge 
Kendall had just let him out unsupervised in 
the community, to be accurate and truthful? 
A: Nobody who was there was saying the 
man is supervised. 
. . . 
Q: Now, you claimed, as I understand it, that 
the source for the words that you used 
“released unsupervised in the community” 
was Assistant Attorney General Renee 
Gumbs Carty who said those words to you 
on a telephone call in which another 
Assistant Attorney General name[d] Kerry 
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Drue supposedly was listening in. Is that 
your testimony? 
A: . . . Yes, sir. 
Q: And I just want to be very clear for the 
jury. 
Your testimony under oath is that Renee 
Gumbs Carty said to you in a telephone call 
in which Attorney General Kerry Drue . . . 
was on the phone as well, that Judge 
Kendall had released Mr. Williams for the 
weekend unsupervised in the community. Is 
that your testimony? 
A: My recollection is that they send [sic] 
him home for the—that they said that the 
Judge—at the request of the defense that the 
Judge sent Mr. Williams home for the 
weekend to get his affairs in order. 
Q: Did they tell you that Judge Kendall had 
released Mr. Williams for the weekend 
unsupervised in the community; yes or no. 
A: I told you what my recollection of what 
they said to me was. 
Q: So they didn’t tell you that. 
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A: They said at the request of the defense, 
again, that Judge Kendall allowed him to go 
home for the weekend to get his affairs in 
order. 
Q: Did they use the word “unsupervised”—
words “unsupervised in the community,” 
Miss Blackburn? Yes or no. 
A: I don’t recall them using the word 
“unsupervised.” 
The only conclusion the jury must have drawn from this 
testimony is that none of the officers at the standoff and 
none of the prosecutors Blackburn spoke with told her 
that Williams was released into the community 
“unsupervised.” This is a necessary conclusion because if 
the jury believed that the officers or the prosecutors did 
tell her this, then there would be direct evidence that 
Blackburn believed that Williams was, in fact, 
unsupervised. 
Importantly, the jury did not necessarily conclude 
that Blackburn lacked a source for her story. To reach 
that conclusion, the jury would have needed to make the 
inferential conclusions that being sent “home” is different 
from being “unsupervised” and that the officers’ lack of 
discussion of supervision was irrelevant to whether 
Blackburn had a source. Although these are reasonable 
inferences, they are not ones we need to defer to under 
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independent review if our review of the evidence brings 
us to a contrary conclusion. See Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. 
at 690; Newton, 930 F.2d at 670–71 (explaining that in 
the independent-appellate-review context, the 
“presumption of correctness” of jury determinations 
“applies with less force when a factfinder’s findings rely 
on its weighing of evidence and drawing inferences”). 
 The evidence does not support the conclusion that 
Blackburn fabricated her story. The parties agree that she 
was at the scene of Williams’s standoff, and her 
testimony shows that the officers did not tell her that 
Williams was under house arrest. Furthermore, the 
prosecutors explained that Judge Kendall sent Williams 
“home.”5
                                                 
5 We may consider Blackburn’s testimony regarding 
what the officers and prosecutors told her because the 
jury did not necessarily reject it. They likely gave it little 
weight, but their weighing of the evidence is accorded 
little deference under our standard of review. 
 Finally, there is no evidence that Blackburn had 
any information that Williams was under house arrest. 
Cf. Schiavone Constr., 847 F.2d at 1090 (explaining that 
recklessness can be found where “the defendant finds 
internal inconsistencies or apparently reliable information 
that contradicts [the defendant’s] libelous assertions, but 
nevertheless publishes those statements anyway”). 
Blackburn’s conclusion that Williams was unsupervised 
is thus reasonably derived from her observations at the 
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scene and her knowledge that he was sent “home.” 
Although she could have done more to verify the facts of 
her story, the information she had assembled shows that 
her conclusion was not fabricated. Actual malice thus 
cannot be established on the basis that the defendants 
fabricated the story. 
 Judge Kendall’s alternative basis for actual malice 
is that Blackburn should have done more to verify the 
facts of her Williams article. She was at least reckless 
regarding her story’s falsity, he argues, because she never 
sought the transcript of the hearing in which Judge 
Kendall imposed house arrest. This cannot serve as a 
basis for finding actual malice, however, because “failure 
to investigate before publishing, even when a reasonably 
prudent person would have done so, is not sufficient to 
establish reckless disregard” absent some evidence 
showing that the defendant seriously doubted the truth of 
the statement. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688. The lack of 
evidence showing any doubt, coupled with the 
determination that the story was not fabricated, means 
that there is insufficient evidence that the defendants 
acted with actual malice. 
C. Retirement Article 
 Finally, Judge Kendall argues that the Daily 
News’s article regarding his retirement is defamatory 
because the subtitle stated that there were “[t]hree 
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judicial conduct complaints against him still pending.”6 
This statement is false, he contends, because the 
complaints had been dismissed by the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands (though the District Court’s ruling was 
still pending on appeal).7
                                                 
6 The defendants contend that this argument is not within 
our grant of certiorari for “whether the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court’s review exceeded the scope of the 
‘independent examination’ required in Bose Corp. v. 
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 
(1984).” Judge Kendall’s argument is within the scope of 
our grant of certiorari because he contends that the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court should have deferred to the jury 
with regard to the testimony of the subtitle’s author, 
J. Lowe Davis, which Judge Kendall believes was 
adequate to establish actual malice. 
7 We assume that the alleged defamatory statement is 
false because our writ of certiorari is limited to the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court’s application of independent 
appellate review to its actual-malice analysis. 
 This is an ordinary defamatory 
statement, so to establish actual malice, Judge Kendall 
must show that the statement was made with “knowledge 
that [the] statement was false or [with] reckless disregard 
of whether it was false or not.” Schiavone Constr. Co., 
847 F.2d at 1089 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
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 Judge Kendall argues that the evidence is 
sufficient in light of the credibility determination that the 
jury supposedly made regarding the testimony of the 
subtitle’s author. The author testified that “[a]t the time 
[she] wrote the headline of the aforementioned article, 
[she] believe[d] that it was entirely accurate and did not 
state or imply any fact that [she] knew to be false or 
about which [she] entertained any serious doubt.” Judge 
Kendall argues that the jury’s finding of actual malice 
means that the jury disbelieved the author’s testimony 
and that the article itself did not state that the complaints 
were still pending. The jury likely made these 
conclusions, but we defer only to the jury’s finding that 
the author’s testimony was incredible. See Harte-Hanks, 
491 U.S. at 690. We do not defer to the jury’s possible 
conclusion that the article did not support the subtitle 
because that conclusion requires an inference from the 
text of the article, which we are free to review 
independently. See id. at 688–89. 
In light of the jury’s credibility determination and 
our review of the remaining evidence, actual malice 
cannot be established by clear-and-convincing evidence. 
The jury’s disbelief of the statement’s author is not 
sufficient because a plaintiff must show more than mere 
disbelief to establish actual malice. Bose, 466 U.S. at 512 
(“When testimony of a witness is not believed, the trier 
of fact may simply disregard it. Normally the discredited 
testimony is not considered a sufficient basis for drawing 
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a contrary conclusion.”). Nothing in the record 
demonstrates that the defendants knew their statement 
was false or were reckless in regard to its falsity. The 
Daily News’s description of the complaints in the body 
of the article itself illustrates that it believed they were 
still pending. The article describes the complaints in the 
present tense—“the complaints against Kendall 
include”—and it accurately reports that Judge Kendall’s 
victory in the District Court was on appeal, suggesting 
that a final determination of the complaints’ fate had not 
been reached.8
                                                 
8 The relevant portion of the article states: 
Since May 2007, The Daily News has 
reported on three separate complaints made 
to the Commission on Judicial Disabilities 
against Kendall. These complaints either 
asked for an investigation into the judge’s 
pattern of conduct from the bench or for his 
removal. 
The complaints against Kendall include: 
[Description of the complaints brought 
separately by Judicial Watch, the Women’s 
Coalition of St. Croix, and a St. Thomas 
businesswoman.] 
 The absence of any evidence that the 
In October 2007, Kendall filed a lawsuit in 
District Court asking the court to stop the 
commission from conducting any hearings 
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Daily News thought its description of the complaints as 
“pending” was or could be false means that there is not 
clear-and-convincing evidence to support a finding of 
actual malice. 
* * * 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court’s ruling that Judge Kendall 
cannot establish the actual malice required to support his 
libel claims. This conclusion means that we need not 
decide whether the justices of the Supreme Court should 
have recused themselves. We have explained that “failure 
to disqualify . . . may be harmless error when a court of 
                                                                                                             
on complaints made against him, contending 
that those hearings would violate the 
separation of powers doctrine and threaten 
the independence of the territorial judiciary. 
In that suit, Kendall contends that he 
scrupulously follows the federal Bail 
Reform Act but some other V.I. Judges do 
not. 
In Jan. 2008, Chief District Court Judge 
Curtis Gomez ruled that the Virgin Islands 
Commission on Judicial Disabilities has no 
authority to remove judges. The commission 
has appealed to the 3rd Circuit Court of 
Appeals. 
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appeals will later review a ruling on a plenary basis.” In 
re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 786 (3d Cir. 1992). 
Plenary review allows us to find harmlessness because 
“[a]ny bias which may have infected the district court’s 
decision is fully remedied by our consideration of the 
motions.” United States v. Vespe, 868 F.2d 1328, 1342 
(3d Cir. 1989); see also Selkridge v. United of Omaha 
Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 170–72 (3d Cir. 2004). 
As explained at the outset, we exercised plenary 
review over the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s 
conclusion that Kendall cannot show actual malice 
because it is a matter of constitutional law. See John, 654 
F.3d at 415, 417–22; Pichardo, 613 F.3d at 98. Any 
possible harm that may have been done by the Supreme 
Court justices’ decision to not recuse themselves (and we 
do not suggest that any harm occurred) is thus eliminated 
by our own review. Our application of independent 
appellate review does not change this analysis. That 
standard only requires deference to jury determinations at 
the trial court, and Judge Kendall does not challenge the 
impartiality of either the trial judge or the jury verdict.  
